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Pharmacy Benefit Managers: What Are The Real Costs Behind-The-Counter? 
 
Dr. Gabrielle Landes 
I. Introduction 
Picking up a prescription is an experience most all Americans will have in their lifetime.  
For many people, visiting the pharmacy is painless—your doctor sends a prescription, the 
pharmacist fills it, and your insurance pays most or all of the bill.  But what does it actually cost 
to fill that prescription?  More importantly—what does it actually cost the pharmacy and the 
patient?  
For Jeff Olson, these questions are answered daily.  Jeff graduated from the University of 
Iowa School of Pharmacy in 1993 when the pharmacy landscape looked much different than it 
does today.  After graduation, Jeff, a native Iowan, returned to his hometown to pursue a career in 
independent community pharmacy.  Upon returning, he became the co-owner and operator of 
Montross Pharmacy in small-town Winterset, Iowa.  Montross Pharmacy is a pillar of the 
community in Winterset; in fact, it will be celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2021.  
When Jeff became a partner in Montross in 1995, retail and community-based pharmacy 
was a different endeavor than it is today.  At the time, pharmacies and pharmacists served patients 
primarily by filling prescriptions and providing counseling services.  While these activities remain 
Jeff’s primary focus, the situation has become more complicated.  In the late 1990s, most patients 
paid for their prescriptions in cash; however, as drug prices began to rise, prescription drug 
coverage became increasingly common through private insurance companies and Medicare Part 
D plans.  This huge change in the pharmacy payment structure has created what Jeff calls the “Low 
Pay-Slow Pay-No Pay” cycle.  
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First: Low Pay.  The low pay portion stems from low reimbursement rates.  Because 
pharmacies must spend money up-front to keep stock on the shelves, they must be reimbursed by 
the insurance company for the cost of the medication and the cost to dispense it.  This system is 
primarily how pharmacies generate revenue.  Over time, however, pharmacy reimbursement rates 
have decreased drastically.  Jeff accounts that he loses an average of $120,000 per year attributable 
to low reimbursement costs.  
Next: Slow Pay.  Slow pay revolves around the Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) 
Fees that claw back additional money on prescriptions after the point of sale.  These fees are not 
applied, however, until months after the initial sale.  Thus, pharmacy owners such as Jeff cannot 
adequately prepare for the amount of money they will owe any given month.  Jeff estimates that 
about 3-6% of his yearly net profits, about $240,000 total, goes towards DIR Fees.  
Lastly: No Pay.  Audits performed on filled prescriptions claw back even more money from 
the pharmacy.  For example, money can be clawed back for something as simple as failure of the 
pharmacist to strike through a hard-copy prescription or for calculating an inaccurate day supply 
for a topical product, which is a difficult task to do precisely.  Jeff has fallen victim to predatory 
audits several times, citing that they are incredibly expensive and unpredictable, making it hard to 
plan the pharmacy’s finances any given month or year.  
Jeff loses approximately half a million dollars in revenue each year to the “Low Pay-Slow 
Pay-No Pay” cycle.  Jeff sees the effects of the losses as twofold: (1) decreased pharmacist job 
availability and satisfaction and (2) lower value patient care.  The monetary losses of pharmacies 
across the country have detrimental effects on the pharmacy, patients, and overall health.  For 
many pharmacy owners across the country, Jeff’s story is a familiar one.  Unfortunately, he is the 
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rule and not the exception.  This begs the question: why is this happening?  Three words: Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers (PBMs).   
Most Americans have neither heard of PBMs nor have any idea what they have to do with 
prescription drug costs.  They are even less likely to be familiar with the dark, secretive side of 
PBMs.  This Comment will explore the terrifying truth of PBMs: the history of PBMs, insight into 
the secretive practices of PBMs, and the ends to which PBMs are willing to go to make a profit.  
Lastly, this Comment will prove that PBM money making schemes are closing pharmacy doors 
for good, costing pharmacists jobs, and negatively impacting patient safety and access to quality 
health care and affordable medications.   
Part II of this Comment will explore what pharmacists do and why they are vital to health 
care.  Part III will take a deep dive into the depths of PBM business practices.  Part IV will aim to 
prove that PBMs historically and continuously skim money off the top of every pharmacy 
transaction, which lowers pharmacy reimbursement rates, affects pharmacist job security and 
satisfaction, and, ultimately, affects patient access to adequate and affordable health care.  Finally, 
Part V will discuss past, current, and future PBM regulation. Specifically, it will discuss former 
President Trump’s eleventh-hour executive orders and regulations; President Biden’s proposed 
regulations on drug prices; and future regulation and legislation.  
II. Pharmacists: What Do They Do and Why Are They Vital to Health Care? 
 
A familiar question most pharmacists receive at some point in their career is an iteration of 
the following: “Why do you have Dr. before your name? You are not a real doctor, right?”1  In 
 
1 See Joseph Epstein, Is There a Doctor in the White House? Not if You Need and M.D., WALL ST.  J. (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-there-a-doctor-in-the-white-house-not-if-you-need-an-m-d-11607727380 (urging 
First Lady Dr. Jill Biden to “drop the ‘Dr.’” from her title because she is not a physician). But see Michael Levenson, 
An Opinion Writer Argued Jill Biden Should Drop the ‘Dr.’ (Few Were Swayed.), N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2020), 
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fact, I have received this question several times.  So, what exactly are pharmacists? And what can 
they do?  The answer: it depends.  
A. Pharmacy Education Throughout the Years  
A pharmacist who graduated before 2000 likely has a Bachelor of Pharmacy (B.Pharm), 
rather than a Doctorate of Pharmacy.  This is because in July 2000 the Accreditation Council for 
Pharmacy Education (ACPE) mandated that all pharmacy schools offer a PharmD program to 
receive accreditation. 2   This was not precisely when PharmD programs came on the scene, 
however.  In fact, the first earliest PharmD–like programs began in the 1940s after World War II.3  
By the late eighties, only 56% of pharmacy schools exclusively offered bachelor’s degrees, while 
14% offered only PharmD programs.4  
The switch to PharmD programs meant a few things for students and faculty: (1) the 
program of study was extended from five to six years; (2) experiential learning was introduced; 
and (3) emphasis shifted to clinically-driven, patient-focused curricula.  Original B.Pharm 
programs were only five years of coursework.  The common approaches were a two-year 
undergrad, three years of formal pharmacy education; one-year undergrad, four years of formal 
pharmacy education; or admittance into formal pharmacy education from high school. 5   As 
PharmD programs were adopted, these structures remained largely unchanged.  The most common 
structure seen today is a two-year pre-pharmacy program, with four years of formal pharmacy 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/us/jill-biden-doctor-wsj.html (“‘If you have a doctorate in pharmacy or 
education or biology, it doesn’t matter: Call yourself doctor . . . .’”).  
2 Teeraporn Supapaan et al., A Transition from the BPharm to the PharmD Degree in Five Selected Countries , 17 
PHARMACY PRAC. 1611, 1613 (2019). 
3 See generally Joseph Fink, Pharmacy: A Brief History of the Profession , STUDENT DR. NETWORK (Jan. 11, 2012, 
9:10 AM) https://www.studentdoctor.net/2012/01/11/pharmacy-a-brief-history-of-the-profession/; Supapapaan, 
supra note 2.  
4 Supapapaan, supra note 2.  
5 Fink, supra note 3. 
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education.  The additional year of the formal pharmacy education was added to require experiential 
learning, called Advanced Pharmacy Practice Experience (APPE).6  
The largest change was within the curriculum.  The traditional B.Pharm curriculum focused 
heavily on medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, and compounding. After the switch, the 
curriculum kept aspects of these elements but focused much more on a patient-centered approach.7  
Another large change that arose from the advent of PharmD programs was post-doctoral 
pharmacist specialization with the introduction of Post-Graduate Year 1 and 2 (PGY-1 and PGY-
2) and Pharmaceutical Industry Fellowship programs.  A recent study found that on average over 
five years, about 47.2% of PharmD graduates apply for PGY-1 residencies, with about 33% 
accepting positions.8  Moreover, the American College of Clinical Pharmacy (ACCP) and the 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) recommend that all pharmacists 
involved in “direct patient care [should] be required to complete a residency prior to entering 
practice by 2020.”9   This switch reflects the profession’s leaders overall agenda of involving 
pharmacists throughout the patient-care process and not solely at the end. 
B. Types of Pharmacy Practices 
Whether it is an insignificant role in a TV show or a commercial featuring gummy vitamins 
that are “Pharmacist Approved,” retail pharmacists are the most well recognized of the profession.  
In fact, a recent study showed that about 65% of pharmacists practice in community–based settings 
while 25% practice in hospital-based settings in the U.S.10  But pharmacists, and the profession as 
 
6 Supapapaan, supra note 2. 
7 See Fink, supra note 3. 
8  Katherine A. Kelley et al., Employment Trends for Doctor of Pharmacy Graduates of Research -Intensive 
Institutions, 2013–2017, 83 AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL ED. 148, 150 (2019).  
9 Supapapaan, supra note 2, at 1614 (while many hospital system employers prefer residency-trained pharmacists, it 
has not been formally required by accreditation standards).  
10 Supapapaan, supra note 2. 
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a whole, have drastically changed throughout the years.  This change is due to several 
circumstances: advocacy by leaders, the switch from BPharm to PharmD, and the assessed need 
in other clinical areas.   
Pharmacists are now involved in a multitude of clinical practices, including Medication 
Therapy Management (MTM), 11  ambulatory care practices, Managed Care Organizations 
(MCOs), pharmaceutical industry, public policy, and association management.12  Through these 
professional advancements, pharmacists have earned the ability to be “supplementary or 
independent prescribers via [C]ollaborative [P]ractice [A]greements.” 13   The most common 
example of this is the ability to administer vaccinations at the pharmacy, a more recent 
advancement of the profession.  Lesser known Collaborative Practice Agreements permit 
pharmacists to provide anticoagulation, diabetes, HIV, and contraceptive management services.14   
C. Future of the Pharmacy Profession 
Although the scope of professional pharmacist services has increased recently, there is still 
room for improvement and expansion of practice.  Pharmacists continue to fight to be recognized 
 
11  Medication Therapy Management (MTM) Services, AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, 
https://www.pharmacist.com/medication-therapy-management-services?is_sso_called=1 (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) 
(“[MTM] is a systematic process of collecting patient-specific information, assessing medication therapies to identify 
medication-related problems, developing a prioritized list of medication-related problems, and creating a plan to 
resolve them.”).  
12 See generally Jon C. Schommer et al., Career Pathways for Pharmacists, 47 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 563 
(2007).  
13 Supapapaan, supra note 2, at 1612; see National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 
Collaborative Practice Agreements and Pharmacists’ Patient Care Services: A Resource for Pharmacists  (2013), 
https://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/pubs/docs/Translational_Tools_Pharmacists.pdf  (a Pharmacist Collaborative Practice 
Agreement (CPA) is “[a] formal agreement in which a licensed provider makes a diagnosis, supervises patient care, 
and refers patients to a pharmacist under a protocol that allows the pharmacist to perform specific patient care 
functions”).  
14 See generally Patti Gasdek Manolakis et al., Pharmacists’ Contribution to Primary Care in the United States 
Collaborating to Address Unmet Patient Care Needs: The Emerging Role for Pharmacists to Address the Shortage of 
Primary Care Providers, 74 AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing the roles of the pharmacists at 
VA hospitals and clinics). 
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as healthcare providers as a matter of law.15  The main purpose for seeking provider status through 
federal legislation is to obtain reimbursement for services pharmacists currently provide.  The 
proposed legislation would “amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage 
under Medicare program of pharmacist services.”16   Although the full scope of the services 
pharmacists are permitted to provide are individually mandated by each state, the proposed 
regulation would formally classify pharmacists as healthcare providers and require reimbursement 
for clinical services.17 
The call for pharmacist provider status from industry leaders and professionals has gained 
strength amid the COVID-19 pandemic.  With a national physician shortage, and health care 
systems and hospitals overwhelmed, pharmacists are ready and able to take over primary health 
care concerns.18  For example, although pharmacists are permitted to administer vaccines in all 
fifty states, some states limit the types of vaccines pharmacists may administer.19  Conferring 
provider status would allow pharmacists to administer all vaccines without Collaborative Practice 
Agreements or state approval, which could increase access to the COVID-19 vaccine and other 
vaccines in the future.  Provider status could also guarantee pharmacists adequate payment for the 
 
15 See Pharmacy and Medically Underserved Areas Enhancement Act, S. 109, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill has not 
yet been introduced during the current session; see also Patrick C. Harper, Pharmacist Provider Status Legislation: 
Projections and Prospects, 55 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 203 (2015).  
16 Pharmacy and Medically Unserved Areas Enhancement Act , supra note 15.  
17 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion on pharmacist-based clinical services. 
18  Debbie Weitzman, Provider Status for Pharmacists: It’s About Time , PHARMACYTIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/provider-status-for-pharmacists-its-about-time; see also Pharmacy 
Organizations Executive Summary, Pharmacists As Front-Line Responders For COVID-19 Patient Care 1, 2 (2020), 
https://www.pharmacist.com/sites/default/files/files/APHA%20Meeting%20Update/PHARMACISTS_COVID19-
Final-3-20-20.pdf.  
19 Weitzman, supra note 18; see also Richard Hughes IV et al., The Pharmacist’s Role in COVID-19 Response Efforts, 
HEALTHAFFAIRS.ORG (Jul. 23, 2020), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/provider-status-for-pharmacists-its-
about-time (explaining that “state laws frequently place limitations on pharmacist -vaccinations based on age, type of 
immunization, and other requirements, such as parent or guardian consent or physician authorization”).  
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provision of acute access to COVID-19, flu, and strep testing, and other treatments for minor 
ailments.20 
D. Pharmacists’ Vitality to Healthcare 
Why is provider status for pharmacists necessary to the health care system?  Because 
pharmacists are uniquely qualified to provide primary care and are the most accessible health care 
providers.21  There is currently a shortage of primary care physicians in the U.S.  The number of 
new physician graduates that choose primary care as a career has fallen by 50% since 1997, and 
only about 2% of all physician graduates plan to work in primary care settings.22  In fact, it is 
estimated that “over 56 million Americans lack adequate access to primary health care . . . .”23  
With the baby boomer population reaching sixty-five years of age, and more people suffering from 
chronic conditions, primary care services are needed now more than ever.  In older populations in 
particular, studies show that “28 percent of patients . . . take five or more chronic medications each 
month.”24  The problems permeating the healthcare system require a shift by all professions to 
improve patient access to care.  Because pharmacists have a deep understanding of medication 
management, adverse events, and diagnostic criteria, they are perfectly positioned to assume roles 
within the primary care system.25  
Pharmacists are also the most accessible health care providers to patients. 26  The lack of 
access to a health care provider is specifically exacerbated in rural areas of the country.  In fact, 
about “20% of the US population—more than 50 million people—live in rural areas, but only 9% 
 
20 Weitzman, supra note 18; Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18. 
21 See Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18. 
22 Manolakis, supra note 14, at 1. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 See Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18. 
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of the nation’s physicians practice” in those communities.27  Conversely, 90% of Americans live 
within five miles of a community pharmacy, thereby making pharmacists the most accessible 
health care provider to all American communities.28  Ensuring pharmacists and essential services 
remain accessible to Americans requires proper pharmacist reimbursement, provider status, and 
an expansion of pharmacists’ scope of practice.  
III. PBMs: Who Are They and How Do They Fit Into Healthcare? 
Most Americans have likely never heard of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).  
Whenever an American fills a prescription, however, they are utilizing PBM services.  This is 
because PBMs are the silent middlemen in all pharmacy transactions; they are perfectly positioned 
between the manufacturers, health plans, and retail pharmacies.29 
PBMs were originally primarily responsible for what is called claims adjudication.30  The 
typical claims adjudication process goes as follows.  A patient arrives at a pharmacy with two 
things in hand: a prescription and an insurance card.  The pharmacy then uses special coding 
provided on the insurance card to bill the patient’s insurance for the prescription.  This is actually 
accomplished through a series of complicated computer transactions with the PBM.  First, the 
patient’s insurance information is transmitted to the PBM, which decides whether the patient’s 
insurance covers the particular drug.  If it does, the claim goes through; if not, it is rejected back 
to the pharmacy.  Assuming the prescription is covered, the PBM then transmits two pieces of 
information back to the pharmacy: (1) the patient’s copayment, if any, and (2) the pharmacy 
 
27 Roger A. Rosenblatt, Physicians and Rural America, 173 WESTERN J. MED. 348 (2000).  
28 Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18. 
29 See Alan Lyles, Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies: Do They Create Value in the US Healthcare System?, 
35 PHARMACOECONOMICS 493, 494 (2017). 
30 See Kwanghuyuk Yoo, Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Conspiracy: Unveiling 
Lock-In Mechanisms, Structural Shortcomings and Antitrust Evidence , 64 S.D. L. REV. 43, 56 (2019) (discussing the 
process of claims adjudication). 
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reimbursement information.  Lastly, the PBM determines how much to bill the health plan for the 
transaction.  Although claims adjudication was the primary impetus for PBMs, they have now 
positioned themselves as the middlemen between many different actors.31  
A. History of PBMs 
The first-generation PBMs came on the scene in the late 1960s as insurance companies 
began covering prescription medications.32  Health plans needed to outsource claims adjudication 
for efficiency reasons, which gave rise to an entirely new health care business.  As PBMs became 
more popular, the model began to change.  In the early 1990s, top pharmaceutical companies, such 
as Eli Lilly, Merck, and SmithKline, purchased large PBMs to create formulary synergy.33  This 
new model allowed pharmaceutical companies to list their drugs as “preferred” through the PBMs 
they respectively owned.34  Eventually this practice was challenged in a breach of fiduciary duty 
class-action lawsuit, which provoked the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to “crack down on the 
PBM/drug company alliance.”35  Although each pharmaceutical company sold their interest in 
PBMs in the early 2000s, the evolution of the PBM business model had lasting effects.36 
Today, there are three major, publicly-traded PBMs: ExpressScripts, OptumRx, and CVS-
Caremark.  These PBMs are responsible for administering prescription drug benefits to over 180 
million people—about 80% of the market.37  They have, essentially, utilized the formulary-based 
 
31 See generally Lyles, supra note 29.  
32 See, e.g., Lyles, supra note 29; Comments of David A. Balto to the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 6, 2017). 
33 Lyles, supra note 29. 
34 See David Dayen, The Hidden Monopolies That Raise Drug Prices: How Pharmacy Benefit Managers Morphed 
From Processors to Predators, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 28, 2017), https://prospect.org/health/hidden-monopolies-
raise-drug-prices/ (“[Merck, Eli Lilly, and SmithKline] could then view competitors’ pricing information and place 
their own drugs over their rivals’ on PBM formularies.”). 
35 Id.  
36 See Lyles, supra note 29. 
37 Yoo, supra note 30, at 55.  
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model that was projected in the original PBM/drug company alliances without triggering the FTC 
antitrust regulation.  The idea of consolidating into three major PBMs, instead of separate, smaller 
health plans or PBMs, was for one effect: bargaining power—they are stronger together than 
apart.38  
PBMs’ current business model is best described as a wagon wheel: PBMs are the hub, 
while the pharmacies, health plans, wholesalers, and manufacturers are the spokes that are all 
interconnected themselves.39  First, PBMs contract with several health plans to create a patient 
network.  For example, according to their website, CVS-Caremark serves as the PBM for thirty-
nine different health plans, which amounts to about eighty million members.40   Large patient 
networks give PBMs sufficient bargaining power with the drug manufacturers to negotiate for 
lower drug prices.  Manufacturers will provide PBMs rebates in exchange for preferred spots on 
their formulary.41  A PBMs’ formulary is a tiered system:  the top tier consists of the most preferred 
medications—typically, drugs from manufacturers with whom they have negotiated the highest 
rebates.  For example, a tiering system may commonly look like the following: “Tier 1—preferred 
generic, Tier 2—non-preferred generic, Tier 3—preferred brand, Tier 4—non-preferred drug, and 
Tier 5—specialty medicines.”42  As you get higher in the tiers, the more expensive the drug is to 
 
38 See generally id. at 56. 
39 Seeley, infra note 45. 
40  CVS Health Plan Partners, https://www.cvs.com/health-insurance/medicare/health-plan-partners?icid=medicare-
tab-partners; see also Lyles, supra note 29, at 495. 
41 Abigail Gore, Exposing the Middlemen in Rising Drug Costs: Modifying Safe Harbor Protections for Pharmacy 
Benefit Manager Rebates Under Federal Anti-Kickback Statutes, 98 OR. L. REV. 297, 301 (2020); see also Balto, 
supra note 32; infra Part III.B.1 discussing PBM rebate practices. 
42 Lyles, supra note 29, at 495. 
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the PBM, health plan, and, ultimately, the patient.43  This formulary serves as the backbone for the 
PBM claims adjudication and pharmacy reimbursement.44 
B. PBMs’ Pricing Scheme 
So, how exactly do PBMs make money?  And why has this business model disrupted the 
prescription drug market?  In order to understand how the system has been exploited, it is important 
to understand how the PBM business model was initially designed to work.  There are three 
primary ways in which PBMs make their money: (1) manufacturer rebates, (2) discounts on 
pharmacy reimbursement rates, and (3) DIR fees.  An overview of the PBM—health plan—
pharmacy interaction is shown in Figure I.  A breakdown of each component will be explored in 





43 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion on patient cost-sharing initiatives by health plans.  
44 See supra Part III for an explanation of PBM claims adjudication; see also infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on 
pharmacy reimbursement. 
45 Elizabeth Seeley, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Practices, Controversies, and What Lies Ahead , COMMONWEALTH 
FUND 1, 2 (2019) https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/mar/pharmacy-benefit-
managers-practices-controversies-what-lies-ahead.  
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PBMs first negotiate with the drug manufacturer for rebates on generic and brand-name 
medications and then list these medications on their preferred formulary.46  Manufacturer rebates 
serve two purposes: (1) to provide payment to the PBM for the service of negotiating and (2) to 
pass savings on to the health plan, overall lowering the price for prescription medications.47  Over 
time, however, the manufacturers have utilized rebate negotiations in exchange for better 
formulary placement and increase market share for their products.48   
PBMs negotiate up to a 40% discount off of the list price of the drug. It is estimated, 
however, that the average rebate price is around 14%, which is to be paid to the PBM by the 
insurance company after the point of sale at the pharmacy.49  A 2015 study found that the rebates 
manufacturers offered to PBMs “totaled about $58 billion of the $350 billion in total gross 
expenditures for brand name drugs . . . .”50  PBMs are then supposed to pass on 90% of the rebate 
to the health plan, which should ideally pass savings to patients in the form of lower premiums 
and copayments.51    
For example, LipitorⓇ (produced by Pfizer) and ZocorⓇ (produced by Merck) are both 
used to treat hyperlipidemia or high cholesterol.  If LipitorⓇ’s list price is $150 and Pfizer offers 
a 40% rebate, the cost of the drug to the health plan is $90 post-rebate.  If ZocorⓇ’s list price is 
$100 and Merck offers a 30% rebate, the cost of the drug to the health plan is $70 post-rebate.  
Barring all other considerations and assuming the medications have equivalent efficacy profiles, 
the PBM should pick ZocorⓇ as the preferred medication because the drug price and rebate 
 
46 See supra Part III.B for a discussion on PBMs’ preferred formulary model. 
47 See generally Seeley, supra note 45; see also Gore, supra note 41, at 302. 
48 Gore, supra note 41, at 302.  
49 Yoo, supra note 30, at 73.  
50 Id. at 75. 
51 Seeley, supra note 45, at 3. 
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combination offer the lowest price.  Under that scenario, the PBM would pass $27 dollars in rebates 
to the health plan and make a profit of $3 on each ZocorⓇ prescription filled by a patient.  This, 
however, is not what often occurs. 
In fact, there are three distinct problems that have emerged from PBMs’ rebating system: 
(1) decreased rebate savings passed through to insurance companies, (2) increased manufacturer 
drug prices, and (3) increased cost-saving and cost-sharing mechanisms for patients.  First, because 
of lack of regulation and transparency, PBMs are not required to disclose the rebates they obtain 
from manufacturers on each drug.52  Thus, PBMs are not incentivized to choose the lowest priced 
drug, but instead the drug with the highest rebate regardless of overall cost.  Moreover, many 
speculate, and there is evidence that PBMs do not pass the full 90% of the rebate to the health 
plans.53  This has detrimental effects on prescription drug costs to the health plan.   
Revisiting the earlier example: even though ZocorⓇ was the lower post-rebate cost 
medication, in reality, the PBM would likely choose LipitorⓇ.  This would allow the PBM to 
instead pass $54 in rebates to the health plan and make a profit of $6 on each LipitorⓇ prescription 
filled, yielding twice the profit for the PBM on each prescription filled than it would earn on 
ZocorⓇ.  Further, PBMs are unlikely to pass the full 90% rebate through to the health plan.  
Assume the PBM in this scenario only passes 85% of the rebate to the health plan.  The health plan 
would only receive $51 in rebates and the PBM would then profit $9 on each LipitorⓇ prescription 
filled.  The health plan would now have to pay $93 dollars for the prescription, as compared to the 
original $90.  While a $3 loss per prescription may seem negligible in the long run, it has the 
 
52 See generally Lyles, supra note 29 at 497; Balto, supra note 32. 
53 Gore, supra note 41, at 302; see Seeley, supra note 45, at 3 (“[S]mall payers and employers have reported  that they 
did not receive this share (i.e., 90%) of savings.”). 
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potential to have a huge impact on health care spending when extrapolated to encompass every 
drug paid for by the health plan.  
Second, aggressive negotiating by PBMs for higher rebates from manufacturers results in 
an inverse increase in drug pricing.  Industry professionals and thought leaders often blame 
investment in innovation and Research and Development (R&D), and other considerations, such 
as patent and regulatory exclusivity, as responsible for increased drug prices.54  The cost of R&D, 
however, only accounts for 15.2% of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies’ total annual 
revenue. 55   If innovation costs are so low compared to annual revenues, then what is the 
justification for such high drug prices?  The answer is that the United States is the only country 
that allows manufacturers to set their own drug prices.56  Therefore, drug manufacturers set drug 
prices “primarily on . . . what the market will bear.”57  For example, LantusⓇ is a popular long-
acting synthetic insulin sold world-wide for the treatment of Type I and Type II diabetes.  In 2015, 
the average cost of LantusⓇ in the U.S. at fifty units per day pre–rebate was $372.75.  In contrast, 
the price of LantusⓇ at fifty units a day in Canada, France, and Germany was $67.00, $46.60, and 
$60.90, respectively.58  This means, at best, America’s price for the same prescription drug from 
the same manufacturer is 5.6 times higher than other countries.  
This independent pricing model is further complicated by PBMs’ use of market power to 
pressure manufacturers into providing higher rebates each year.  In a perfect world, the rebates are 
supposed to keep drug prices low; in reality, however, to make up for costs manufacturers provide 
 
54 See Kesselheim, supra note 62, at 863. 
55 See id. (discussing results in Table 4 from a 2014 study of Sales and R&D Costs).  
56 Id. at 860. 
57 Id. at 863. 
58 Id. at 859. 
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in discounts in one year, they send drug prices soaring the next.59  For example, in 2016, Eli Lilly’s 
HumalogⓇ, a popular short-acting insulin for the treatment of diabetes, was more than double its 
price in 2011.60   When reporters from the Wall Street Journal inquired about the stark price 
increase, Lilly reported that they were actually making less on HumalogⓇ in 2016 than in 2009.61  
The reason?  PBMs’ continuous demand for higher rebates in exchange for preferred placement 
on formulary lists.  
Lastly, because rebate savings often are less than anticipated by the health plans, they are 
required to employ several other strategies to keep premiums and escalating drug costs down.  
These tactics usually take form in patient cost-sharing initiatives, such as copayments or high 
deductible plans.62  These tactics will be discussed in further detail in Part IV-C. 
2. Pharmacy Reimbursement Rates: “The Pricing Horribles” 
PBMs continually make a profit from discounts and claw-backs on pharmacy 
reimbursement rates.  A pharmacy’s reimbursement consists of two components: ingredient costs 
and the dispensing fee. 63   First, because the pharmacy must front most of the cost to keep 
medications in stock, they must be reimbursed by the PBM for the cost of obtaining the medication 
from the wholesaler. 64   Second, the dispensing fee pays for materials required for filling 
 
59 Gore, supra note 41, at 302; see also Denise Roland and Peter Loftus, Insulin Prices Soar While Drugmakers’ Share 
Stays Flat; Role of Health-Care Middlemen Fuel Market with Higher List Prices; Deep Discounts are Available to 
Some, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/insulin-prices-soar-while-drugmakers-share-stays-
flat-1475876764.  
60 Roland & Loftus, supra note 59. 
61 Id.  
62 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects 
for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 864 (2016); see also infra Part IV.C for a discussion on how cost-sharing and cost-saving 
measures affect patients. 
63 Yoo, supra note 30, at 81. 
64  Lisa L. Causey, Nuts and Bolts of Pharmacy Reimbursement: Why It Should Matter To You  (June 2009) 
(unpublished note, University of Houston Law School) (on file with Houston Journal o f Health Law and Policy at 
https://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(LC)%20Pharmacy.pdf).  
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prescriptions (e.g., amber vials and bags) and labor costs (e.g., pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians).65  Dispensing fees and patient copayments are the primary ways pharmacies make a 
profit from filling prescriptions.66  
In order to understand pharmacy reimbursement, it is important to understand the complex 
pricing system and flow of money between health plans, PBMs, and pharmacies.  The price paid 
to the wholesalers is called the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC).67  This is the price at which 
manufacturers sell drugs to wholesalers and pharmacies.68  This is not, however, the price used in 
the pharmacy reimbursement calculation.   
Instead, pharmacy reimbursement is calculated using one of three other price benchmarks: 
Average Wholesale Price (AWP), Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC), or Average Manufacturers 
Price (AMP).69  The AWP is not the actual price of the medication; instead, it is “an artificial 
benchmark set by the drug manufacturer.”70  Manufacturers and PBMs also use AWP during rebate 
negotiations.71  AWP is the WAC plus a 12–20% markup.72  Conversely, MAC is the “upper limits 
that PBMs or health insurers pay retail pharmacies for generic . . . and . . . brand drugs.”73  This 
rate is determined by using the average published AWP or WAC prices.  Generally, MAC prices 
are 50–60% lower than AWP prices.74  Different from WAC or AWP, AMP is the actual sales 
 
65 See id. 
66 Yoo, supra note 30, at 81. 
67 Id. at 60–61. 
68 Id.  
69 See id. at 61; Causey, supra note 64.  
70 Yoo, supra note 30, at 60. 
71 Id. at 61. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 62 
74 Id. at 84. 
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price reported by manufacturers.75  Therefore, AMP prices are usually lower than WAC or AWP 
prices, but higher than the actual acquisition cost to the pharmacy. 
How exactly does “the pricing horribles” scheme fit into pharmacy reimbursement rates?  
To keep copayment and reimbursement rates lower, PBMs will contract with certain retail 
pharmacies to create pharmacy “networks.”  Large, corporate chain retail pharmacies, such as 
Walgreens and CVS, will then offer discounts on different price points (AWP, AMP, and MAC) 
to negotiate for a better position within the PBMs’ preferred network.76  For brand medications, 
PBMs typically calculate a pharmacy’s reimbursement based on AWP, less any pharmacy 
discounts, plus a dispensing fee.77  Pharmacies typically purchase medications based on WAC, but 
will offer a discount of about 12–15% of AWP (recall that AWP is WAC plus a 12-20% markup).78  
Thus, pharmacies are generally reimbursed the exact amount it costs to acquire brand named 
medications from the wholesaler. 
For generic medications, PBMs typically reimburse pharmacies based on MAC prices.79  
PBMs keep MAC list prices private, however, and do not allow health plans to see the actual 
reimbursement to pharmacies.80  Thus, PBMs charge the health plan a higher amount for the drug 
while reimbursing the pharmacy at the listed MAC price, creating what is known as spread 
pricing.81  For example, a PBM in Ohio “reimbursed pharmacies 2.3 billion and billed Medicaid 
2.5 billion . . . , resulting in a spread of $200 million” in profit to the PBM.82  Not only do PBMs 
 
75 Id. at 64. 
76 Yoo, supra note 30, at 70; see also Lyles, supra note 29, at 496. 
77 Yoo, supra note 30 at 84.  
78 Id. 
79 Seeley, supra note 45, at 5. 
80 Id.; see also Yoo, supra note 30, at 70–71. 
81 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 30, at 80; Balto, supra note 32.  
82 Seeley, supra note 45, at 5. 
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profit from the spread, they also profit from slowly updating MAC lists.  Ideally, MAC is typically 
on par with WAC, meaning the pharmacy is reimbursed at or slightly above cost for generic 
medications.  This is to induce pharmacies to fill for lower cost generics instead of brand 
medications.  When manufacturers raise the prices on generics, however, PBMs are slow to correct 
MAC pricing.83  This means that WAC is now substantially higher than MAC, which results in 
pharmacies being reimbursed less than acquisition cost.  Conversely, if the manufacturer drops the 
generic price, PBMs quickly update the MAC list, ensuring pharmacies are not reimbursed more 
than their acquisition cost.84  Because of the need to compete for the PBMs’ business, pharmacies 
are not able to be reimbursed at a markup like a typical business.  Instead, they are reimbursed at 
or below cost, which lowers their overall profit on each prescription.  
Moreover, the payment for dispensing the medication does not reflect its actual cost.  A 
study conducted in 2007 noted that while it typically costs around $10.50 to dispense a 
prescription, most pharmacies were only reimbursed a dispensing fee around $4.50 on average.85  
A more recent study calculated the average cost of filling a prescription at $12.40, with $7.22 of 
that cost directly attributed to payroll expenses.86  Thus, pharmacies are reimbursed at or below 
what it costs to purchase the medication and cost to dispense the medication, which leads to an 
overall net loss on each prescription filled.  “The Pricing Horribles” stands as a barrier to 
pharmacies making a profit from their main business model: selling prescriptions. 
 
83  Michael Matalavage, Navigating the Complexities of Pharmacy Reimbursement: Will We Ever Reach 




85 Causey, supra note 64 (citing to Sandra Levy, Dispensing Fees Woefully Inadequate, Says Study, (Feb. 19, 2007), 
available at http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id-404988). 
86  Sarah Shoemaker-Hunt et al., Cost of Dispensing Study, ABT ASSOCIATES (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.nacds.org/pdfs/pharmacy/2020/NACDS-NASP-NCPA-COD-Report-01-31-2020-Final.pdf.  
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3. Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees 
The final piece of the PBM profit scheme is Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.  
DIR Fees were initially implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) upon the 
enactment of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.87  The statute requires PBMs to send an 
annual report to CMS encapsulating the gross cost of prescription drugs that were not captured at 
the point of sale. 88   For example, PBMs are often provided additional discounts from the 
manufacturers after the point of sale in the form of supplemental rebates or patient co-pay 
assistance programs, such as manufacturer coupons.89  Because the federal government aims to 
keep drug costs low for taxpayers, CMS intended DIR reports to provide them with the accurate 
costs of medications to reimburse at the lowest cost possible.90   In theory, this retrospective 
analysis should provide pharmacies with a more accurate reimbursement rate; however, PBMs 
have vastly expanded the scope of DIR Fees.  
PBMs use DIR Fees for many different fees, such as, “costs for pharmacies to participate 
in a Part D preferred network, price reconciliations based on contractual rates, compliance fees for 
contract-based performance metrics, or a combination of these fees.”91  In reality, PBMs are using 
DIR Fees as a way to claw back additional money from the pharmacy after the point of sale.92  In 
 
87 Michael Gabay, Direct and Indirect Remuneration Fees: The Controversy Continues, 52 HOSPITAL PHARMACY 740 
(2017). 
88 See National Community Pharmacists Association, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About Pharmacy “DIR” 
Fees, http://www.ncpa.co/pdf/dir-faq.pdf. 
89 White Paper: PBM DIR Fees Costing Medicare and Beneficiaries: Investigative White Paper on Background, Cost 
Impact, and Legal Issues, FRIER LEVITT: PHARMACY L. (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.frierlevitt.com/articles/service/pharmacylaw/white-paper-pbm-dir-fees-costing-medicare-beneficiaries-
investigative-white-paper-background-cost-impact-legal-issues/.  
90 See Gabay, supra note 87.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
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fact, most pharmacies report that PBMs are applying DIR Fees months after the initial sale, making 
it nearly impossible to predict how much money a pharmacy will owe to a PBM any given month.93 
One example of DIR Fees is tied to CMS’s “5-Star” ratings.94  CMS puts forth patient 
quality metrics and standards, such as medication adherence to regimens for chronic conditions 
like diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia.95  PBMs with better patient quality metrics will 
receive a higher 5-Star rating from CMS.96  This 5-Star rating then directly correlates to how much 
a PBM is reimbursed on Medicare Part D claims.97  To ensure that patients who utilize the PBMs 
services meet these metrics, PBMs perform audits on pharmacies.  For example, PBMs will 
measure how often and likely patients are to refill their prescriptions on time as a way to measure 
the patient’s adherence to the medication regimen—a measure over which a pharmacy has little 
control.98  Then, based on the adherence data, the PBM will assign a performance rating to that 
particular pharmacy.99  The lower the performance rating, the higher the DIR Fees that are imposed 
on that pharmacy.100  This is a way for the PBM to make up the difference in cost from CMS for 
a lower 5-Star rating.  The average amount of these DIR Fees can be anywhere from $2 to $12 on 
each claim.101  Further, if a pharmacy’s performance rating continues to remain low, the PBM will 
 
93 Id.; see also supra Part I for a real-world explanation of DIR Fees within the “low pay-slow pay-no pay” cycle.  





98 See Traynor, supra note 94, at 548 (adverse events, a  change in medical status, and even the use of product samples 
obtained from a patient’s physician might also affect an assessment of adherence on the basis of pharma cy claims 
data.”); see also Dayen, supra note 34 (quoting a local pharmacy owner as saying, “I can’t stop by your house and say 
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83. 
99 See Traynor, supra note 94.  
100 See Dayen, supra note 34. 
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use it as a way to negotiate lower reimbursement to the pharmacy through continual DIR Fees or 
lower preferred network placement.102  Failure to pay the fees will result in the pharmacy being 
removed from the preferred network list entirely, leaving patients to find a new pharmacy 
altogether.103  
Initially, the fees were only for Medicare Part D claims, however, there is evidence that 
most PBMs have started using these fees on private insurance claims as well, clawing back even 
more money from pharmacies.104  The PBMs argue that the savings from DIR Fees are passed onto 
health plans, which subsequently lowers premium and copayment costs to patients.105  There is no 
evidence, however, that PBMs actually pass any revenue of DIR Fees to the health plans.106  In 
fact, the evidence indicates that PBMs’ DIR Fees actually increase patient costs.107  Because PBMs 
are not required to report DIR Fees, they obscure the actual cost of the medication, keep MAC 
prices higher, and retain the profits from lower reimbursement rates to pharmacies.108   This 
particularly affects patients who use Medicare Part D by forcing them into the “donut hole” faster 
and requiring them to pay for their medications out-of-pocket.109  Higher drug costs also require 
CMS to allocate additional taxpayer dollars to fund Medicare Part D.110  
IV. How PBM Pricing Schemes Affect Pharmacies, Pharmacists, and Patients. 
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While rebates, reimbursement rates, and DIR Fees may seem negligible in isolation, 
together they create catastrophic effects on the health care system and most notably on retail 
pharmacies, pharmacists’ wages, and patient’s pocketbooks.  
A. Retail Pharmacies: A Dying Breed? 
Retail pharmacies are hit the hardest by PBMs in two distinct areas: (1) reimbursement  
rates and (2) DIR Fees.  As explained above, a pharmacy’s reimbursement consists of both 
acquisition and dispensing costs. Because of MAC and AWP price gouging, pharmacies are being 
reimbursed at or below acquisition costs for medications.111  Additionally, pharmacies’ dispensing 
fees are often reimbursed below the actual cost to fill a medication. 112   Together, low 
reimbursement rates hinder a pharmacy’s ability to make a profit.  Next, PBMs employ large DIR 
Fees on pharmacies, which claw back additional revenue.113   
The combination of these two factors create an unsustainable business model, making it 
difficult for pharmacies to keep their lights on and doors open.  For example, Cleveland Clinic has 
eighteen retail pharmacy locations and one specialty pharmacy.  In 2017, it reported over $250,000 
in DIR Fees alone, doubling the amount it paid in those fees in 2015.114  Don Carroll, Associate 
Chief of Pharmacy at Cleveland Clinic noted that as the number of prescriptions its pharmacies 
filled increased, the DIR fees increased as well, “but . . . declining to participate in pharmacy 
networks of large national PBMs would cut off Cleveland Clinic’s pharmacies from a large portion 
of its customers . . . .”115 
 
111 See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on pharmacy reimbursement rates and MAC/AWP pricing.  
112 See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on dispensing fees.  
113 See supra Part III.B.3. 
114 Traynor, supra note 94, at 546.  
115 Id. 
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This presents a large, gaping hole in the PBM–Retail Pharmacy relationship: bargaining 
power.  Large, corporate retail pharmacies can bargain for better placement on preferred network 
lists by providing higher discounts on acquisition costs (i.e., AWP/MAC prices).116  Additionally, 
corporate pharmacies attached to large grocery store chains are often able to make up margins lost 
in pharmacy DIR Fees and low reimbursement rates through grocery or other sales.117   This 
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that two of the largest corporate retail pharmacies, CVS 
and Walgreens, own two out of the five largest PBMs, CVS/Caremark and Envision, 
respectively.118  This reinforces large-scale “vertical integration in the supply distribution chain” 
and allows pharmacy-owned PBMs to set their own pricing and force others to follow suit.119 
Those “others” left out in the cold are often independent and rural retail pharmacies.  
Independent pharmacies lack sufficient bargaining power against PBMs. 120   This means 
independent pharmacies face “take-it-or-leave-it” deals; if they turn down the PBMs, they are 
required to turn away patients that utilize the PBMs’ services.121  But if the pharmacy accepts the 
deal, they’re subject to huge profit losses.122  The lack of profit from filling prescriptions sends 
independent pharmacies, and even large retailers, into a financial tailspin.  A study in 2019 found 
 
116 See Yoo, supra note 30, at 81; see also Aina Abell & Rachel Balick, Behind Closed Doors: What Happens When 
Pharmacies Close?, 26 PHARMACY TODAY: INNOVATIONS 23, 25 (2020) (“Pharmacies who are forced to accept 
contracts that pay them less per prescription than they received in the past, and also experience DIR fees and other 
claw backs from revenue . . . , are seeing their overall revenue from dispensing decrease, despite continuing to fill 
large numbers of prescriptions[.]”).  
117 See Abell & Balick, supra note 116, at 24–25 (“Pharmacies, especially retailers like grocery and discount stores 
that operate pharmacy departments . . . depend on nonprescription revenue . . . .”).  
118 Thomas A. Hemphill, The “Troubles” With Pharmacy Benefit Managers, REG: HEALTH & MED. 16 (Spring 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2017/3/regulation -v40n1-5.pdf. 
119 See id.  
120 See id. (“[I]ndependent pharmacies are looking to acquire a larger share of the PBM’s “spread” to enhance their 
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that, from 2009 to 2015, about 9,564 (12.8%) pharmacies closed their doors.123  The study showed 
that independent pharmacies suffered most of the blow.  Approximately 27% of the pharmacies 
that closed in urban areas and 23% of the pharmacies that closed in rural areas were independent 
pharmacies.124   
Even local, grocery store-backed retail pharmacies, however, are having to shutter 
operations.  For example, California-based Raley’s Supermarkets shut down twenty-seven of their 
nearly one-hundred locations, citing “high operating and drug costs, and low reimbursement rates 
from Medicare, [California State Medicaid], and private health insurers.”125  With drug prices 
steadily increasing, reimbursement rates remaining low, and DIR Fees at an all-time high, 
independent pharmacies are struggling to come up with ways to make ends meet.  
To increase and diversify revenue streams, many pharmacies have begun offering different 
types of clinical services.  These services include Medication Therapy Management (MTM) and 
Comprehensive Medication Reviews (CMRs), Medication Synchronization, immunizations, and 
adherence measures.126  Although these services are great ideas in theory, there are several barriers 
to execution.  First, it remains an open question whether pharmacies are properly reimbursed by 
PBMs for these services.  One study found that most payers recognized the potential cost-saving 
of allowing community pharmacies to provide additional services, but had concerns about financial 
and legal risks.  Payers recognized that if “pharmacists ha[d] the regulatory ability to provide 
services, then the payer organization could have negotiations as they would with a physician’s 
 
123 Jenny S. Guadamuz et al., Assessment of Pharmacy Closures in the United States from 2009 through 2015, 180 
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124 Id.; see also Abell & Balick, supra note 116, at 24.  
125 Abell & Balick, supra note 116116, at 23, 25. 
126 See generally Abell & Balick, supra note 116116, at 27; Tom Kosty, Retail Pharmacy Clinical Services: Influence 
of ACOs & Healthcare Financing Model, (June 25–27, 2015), presented at American Society for Automation In 
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practice.”127  Lack of federal provider status obstructs the pharmacy profession from providing 
vital services to the community and realizing additional revenue streams that would allow 
pharmacies to keep their doors open.128 
Pharmacies closings often have negative implications on patient health.  In rural areas in 
particular, pharmacists may be the only accessible health care provider for patients, which makes 
pharmacists absolutely vital to primary care functions.129  Pharmacists provide several primary 
care functions for patients, such as counseling on adverse drug events, drug interactions, 
medication therapy management, adherence, and over-the-counter remedies. 130   Moreover, 
pharmacists often serve as the first line of triage for patients, instructing them to seek further 
physician consultation in an office visit, urgent care, or emergency room.  These patient 
interactions with pharmacists can make the difference between detrimental disease progression 
and remission or cure.  
B. Pharmacists: The Wage Wars 
In order to lower overall costs associated with running a pharmacy, many pharmacies have 
begun a series of layoffs, hiring freezes, and decreased wages.131  For example, in 2019, Walmart 
laid off about 3% of its pharmacy staff, in which about half was senior staff.132  This has led not 
only to a lot of pharmacists being out of work, but increased burdens on the pharmacists that 
 
127 Bradley S. Merrill et al., Payers’ Perspectives on Pharmacist-Directed Care in a Community Pharmacy Setting, 
53 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 916, 920 (2019).  
128 See supra Part II.C discussing pharmacist provider status. 
129 See infra Part II.D discussing pharmacists’ vitality to health care and access for patients. 
130 See infra Part II.C discussing the importance of patient access to affordable medications and pharmacists.  
131 See Abell & Balick, supra note 116, at 27. 
132  Christine Blank, Walmart Layoffs Impact Senior Staff, DRUG TOPICS (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.drugtopics.com/view/walmart-layoffs-impact-senior-staff.  
 28 
remain.133  For example, a high-volume store that normally requires two pharmacists working 
simultaneously, may now only have one pharmacist working the full twelve-hour shift. 134  
Similarly, a 2016 study reported that 61% of responding pharmacists found their workload to be 
high or excessively high and that it had increased or greatly increased over the past year.135  The 
burdens and demands of the fast-paced workflow do not allow pharmacists to provide clinical 
benefits to patients.  In fact, the above 2016 study found that increased workload infringed on the 
ability of pharmacists to adequately solve drug therapy problems, prevent or reduce potential 
errors, and spend adequate time counseling patients—all vital functions to effectively serving 
patients.136 
Pharmacists wages have also been significantly cut over the years.  In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the demand for pharmacists was high and the number of pharmacy schools and 
graduates increased rapidly.137  Although necessary at the time, it has now led to market saturation.  
Rumblings across pharmacy blogs, Reddit pages, and inner circles offer proof that oversupply and 
lack of demand for pharmacist services has created a wage crisis for many.  One Reddit user claims 
that, in 2016, they were offered a staff position with a corporate chain pharmacy at $58 per hour.138  
In 2017, however, that same corporate chain pharmacy was offering new graduates only $56 per 
 
133 See generally Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Union Alleges Overwork and Understaffing at CVS Pharmacies, CHI. TRIBUNE 
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hour.139  While that example may only be a modest decrease, with pharmacy school tuition rates 
rapidly increasing and potential wages lowering, pharmacy education is becoming a bad 
investment.  For example, most pharmacists graduate with an average student loan debt of 
$213,000.140  While approximately 15,000 pharmacists graduate each year, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projects a negative 3% job growth for pharmacists over the next ten years.141  What 
exactly are new graduates with mounting student loan debt expected to do for an adequate return-
on-investment?   
The culmination of these burdens leads to pharmacist burnout and patient safety concerns. 
One study found that 53.2% of pharmacists experience high levels of burnout. 142   Most 
pharmacists in the study cited emotional exhaustion, reduced personal accomplishment, and 
depersonalization as reasons for professional burnout.143   Another study across all healthcare 
professions found that burnout can result in increased medical errors and patient safety risks.144  
C. Patients: Hitting ‘Em Where It Hurts—Their Pocketbooks 
One of the most prominent consequences of PBM pricing schemes was the implementation 
of patient cost-sharing initiatives, particularly for older adults on Medicare.  In order to make up 
for the costs insurance companies are losing in rebates to the PBMs, payers initiated four types of 
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cost-sharing programs: premiums, copayments, deductibles, and the “donut-hole.”145  While only 
premiums and copayments are utilized by private insurers, Medicare Part D programs often 
employ all four cost-sharing strategies.146  
The earliest two strategies employed in cost-sharing initiatives were premiums and 
copayments.  Premiums, which have been employed for the longest, require that the patient 
essentially “pays-to-play.”  The premium is the amount the patient pays monthly or yearly in 
exchange for prescription and  medical insurance coverage. 147   Although premiums are not 
unfamiliar among other types of insurance coverage, health insurance premiums have significantly 
risen over time.  In fact, from 1999 to 2016, private health insurance premiums rose by 213%, 
compared to an increase in employee’s wages and overall inflation at 60% and 44%, 
respectively.148 
Due to patient dissatisfaction over premium increases, health plans initiated copayments to 
offset some of the costs.  Copayments are what the patient pays out-of-pocket at the pharmacy to 
supplement the insurance coverage of the prescription. 149   The pricing of copayments varies 
dramatically and many factors influence a patient’s copay.  The biggest influences on copayments 
are a patient’s premium payment, preferred or non-preferred medication, PBM tier lists, and the 
 
145 Kenneth E. Thorpe, Out-Of-Pocket Prescription Costs Under A Typical Silver Plan are Twice as High as They are 
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patient-selected plan.150  While a patient’s copayment can be as little as a few cents, patients can 
also experience copayments that are thousands of dollars.151  
Two large influences on a patient’s copayment are whether they have selected a high 
deductible plan or are in the “donut-hole.”  High Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs) and the “donut-
hole” are two of the newest types of cost-sharing initiatives.152  HDHPs allow patients to exchange 
lower premiums for higher out-of-pocket costs up front.153  Therefore, there is no coverage on the 
cost of medications until the patient pays the requisite amount for their insurance to “kick-in.”  
HDHPs have become increasingly more popular over the years, growing from 4% in 2006 to 29% 
in 2016.154  Further, high deductibles have become even higher over the years.  From 2006 to 2016, 
the average deductible “grew from $584 to $1,478 . . . , with 51% of workers at large employers 
in 2016 having insurance with an annual deductible of [greater than] $1,000.”155   
HDHPs are ideal for patients who are healthy and only utilize the health plan’s services 
seldomly or not at all.156  This allows healthy patients to have low monthly premiums and only 
pay high out-of-pocket costs if they have a catastrophic health care event.  Therefore, it is 
theoretically possible that a healthy patient would never have to pay more than the low monthly 
premium.  Due to the favorable premium prices, however, many patients that are not healthy also 
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select high deductible–high copayment hybrid plans, which leaves them with unaffordable 
medication prices.157   
The last cost-sharing initiative is potentially the most confusing and unexpected to patients: 
the “donut-hole.”  The “donut-hole” is a colloquial term for a coverage gap.158   Essentially, 
throughout a patient’s year of coverage, they begin on one side of the donut, traveling to the other 
side and, when they hit the hole in the center, they lose prescription drug coverage.  Patients enter 
the donut-hole once the health plan has paid a certain amount of money towards cost-sharing.159  
To get out of the donut-hole, however, the patient must spend a certain amount of money out-of-
pocket. 160   Once the patient has reached the requisite total out-of-pocket expenditure, the 
Catastrophic Benefit Coverage will set in and coverage resumes.161 
There are several major problems with the donut-hole.  First, patients’ biggest complaints 
about the donut-hole center around not knowing when they will reach it.  Most patients have no 
idea how much their insurance has paid throughout the year; further, they have no idea how much 
they have to spend to get out of the donut-hole.  Absent spending several hours on hold waiting 
for a customer service representation to assist, many patients struggle to obtain this critical 
information.  To add more confusion, in 2019 Medicare promised to eliminate the donut-hole by 
2020.  Instead, Medicare began calling it the “coverage-gap” and merely supplemented donut-hole 
coverage slightly.162 
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Second, to add insult to injury, the price that health plans use to determine if the patient 
has met the upper limits to send them into the donut hole is based on the drug’s list price.163  In 
reality, however, the insurance company is receiving heavy subsidies in rebates from the PBM and 
manufacturers on each prescription.  Thus, the price that is calculated to push the patient into the 
donut hole is higher than what the insurance company has actually paid.164  A study conducted in 
2020 found that if health plans based beneficiary cost-sharing initiatives on the rebate price, rather 
than the list price, annual patient out-of-pocket costs would reduce, on average, by $91.165  The 
study also found that “[t]wenty percent of beneficiaries would see annual out-of-pocket savings of 
more than $100, . . . five percent would see annual savings of more than $500, and nearly one 
percent would see annual savings of more than $1,000.”166 
Lastly, donut-hole plans are often combined with high deductible and copayment plans in 
the name of lowering patient premiums.167  This means that throughout the year of coverage, a 
patient could theoretically pay a high deductible, high copayments based on non-preferred or brand 
name medications, out-of-pocket costs towards the donut hole, and then continue to pay 
copayments after reaching the Catastrophic Benefit Period.  Over a coverage year, many patients 
pay thousands of dollars in cost-sharing pricing schemes.  For example, the 2021 Medicare Part D 
Proposed Standard Cost-Sharing Plan includes all three initiatives.  The patient has an initial 
deductible of up to $445; a coverage period that includes a 25% copayment on all prescriptions 
and a payer upper limit of $3,097.50.  Once the payer reaches the upper limit, the patient is in the 
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coverage gap, during which they will pay up to $5,183.75 in copayments.  Finally, once a patient 
reaches a total out-of-pocket cost of $6,550, the Catastrophic Benefit Period takes effect and 
coverage resumes.168 
While increased cost-sharing schemes have huge impacts on a patient’s purse strings, they 
can also significantly affect patient health.  A 2015 poll found that about 25% of 648 respondents 
“reported that they or another family member did not fill a prescription in the last year because of 
cost[s].” 169  Further, patients prescribed brand-named medication were less likely to adhere to 
their regimen compared to those prescribed a less costly generic medication.170  Lack of adherence 
to medication regimens has been shown to lead to worse health outcomes and increased health 
care costs overall.  In fact, it is estimated that nonadherence contributes to “$105 billion in 
avoidable health care costs annually.”171   
V. Resolutions 
A. Previous Federal Action on PBMs 
In recent years, Congress, the public, and former President Trump have focused increasing 
attention on PBM unethical practices.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) first attempted to regulate PBM practices.  The DOJ accused PBMs of violating the Federal 
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the False Claims Act while negotiating rebate agreements with 
manufacturers and failing to disclose such agreements to the government.172  The AKS makes it a 
criminal offense to “‘knowingly and willfully’ offer, pay, solicit, or receive any ‘remuneration’ to 
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induce referrals of items or services . . . under the federal health care programs.”173  The alleged 
violation stemmed from the PBM practice of placing certain medications higher on formulary lists 
based on the negotiated rebate instead of considerations such as the safety and efficacy of the 
medication.174   
These actions against PBMs, however, mostly resulted in private settlements with the 
government.175  This is because the federal government concluded that PBMs’ rebate practices are 
seemingly covered under the discount safe harbor provision of the AKS.176  The discount safe 
harbor protects a federal health care program provider (i.e., manufacturer, physician or pharmacist) 
from anti-kickback liability when providing a discount or reduction in price for an item or 
service.177  Discounts are defined to include rebates “whose terms are ‘fixed and disclosed in 
writing to the buyer at the time of initial purchase to which the discount applies, but which is not 
given at the time of sale.’”178  While PBMs are not explicitly listed as covered providers under the 
safe harbor provisions, it has become clear over the years that the federal government views PBM 
rebates as falling within the statutory exemption.179 
A. Recent Presidential Proposals 
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Before the 2016 election, focus shifted towards skyrocketing drug prices when 
pharmaceutical companies such as Valeant raised drug prices by forty-eight times overnight.180  If 
there was one thing the Democrats and Republicans could agree on, it was that drug prices were 
too high.  Throughout much of his campaign, President Trump promised future legislation on drug 
pricing and in 2018, he began zeroing in on PBMs.  Trump proposed permitting PBMs and 
manufacturers to continue to negotiate rebates freely while mandating that one-third of those 
rebates be directly passed onto the patients at the point-of-sale.181  Trump also proposed revising 
the current AKS to include restrictions on rebate practices.182  The Trump solution, however, also 
proposed two new safe harbors: (1) point-of-sale reductions in price offered by drug manufacturers 
directly to patients and (2) PBM service fees for claims adjudication.183   
The proposed regulations were intended to encourage up-front discounts for patients, rather 
than cost-saving strategies that may or may not trickle down into lowered premiums.184  The White 
House formally proposed the plan in February 2019.  Trump, however, rescinded the proposal in 
its entirety in July 2019.185  While White House officials pointed to pending legislation as the 
excuse, many speculate that aggressive lobbying campaigns from two of the largest PBMs—CVS 
and OptumRx—were ultimately responsible for the plan’s demise.186 
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As the 2020 election etched eerily closer, and the COVID-19 pandemic mandated a hard 
look at our country’s health care system, there was renewed hope that legislative efforts on drug 
pricing would be revitalized.  On July 24, 2020, President Trump issued three executive orders 
regarding drug pricing practices.187  Those orders took aim at high drug prices by: (1) lowering the 
cost of insulin, (2) allowing the international importation of medications, and (3) eliminating 
kickbacks to middlemen (PBMs).  First, Trump ordered Medicare and Medicaid to purchase 
insulin at Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) 340B prices, which permits insulin and 
other medications to be purchased at wholesale prices.188  Second, Trump ordered that patients be 
permitted to import safe prescription medication from Canada or European countries at a lower 
price.189   Lastly, Trump ordered that rebates be passed onto patients at the point of sale, the 
elimination of discount safe harbor protection in the AKS, and for new point-of-sale discount safe 
harbors.190 
On September 13, 2020, President Trump issued a fourth executive order addressing 
manufacturer drug pricing.191  That proposal aimed to lower drug prices based on “The Most-
Favored Nation Price.”   The order defines the most-favored nation price to mean  
the lowest price, after adjusting for volume and differences in national gross 
domestic product, for a pharmaceutical product that the drug manufacturer sells in 
a member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) that has a comparable per-capita gross domestic product.192   
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In effect, the executive order prevents Medicare Part D patients from paying more out-of-pocket 
than the most-favored-nation price for that particular medication.193 
There are several issues with and rebuttals to this executive action.  In December 2019, the 
House Democrats proposed similar legislation based on international pricing, which Trump 
vetoed.194  Many industry leaders, and even Republican supporters, have criticized the action for 
predicating prices on international standards.  For industry leaders, such as Stephen Ubl, the chief 
executive of PhRMA, the concern is that the policy is “unworkable” and “will give foreign 
governments a say in how America provides access to treatments . . . .”195  In contrast, many 
Republicans are concerned that adopting drug prices from other countries is “effectively importing 
socialism.”196   
The rule was quickly challenged in December 2020 in a Maryland District Court by 
PhRMA.197  While the rule was set to go into effect on January 1, 2021, the District Court judge 
temporarily restrained the order.198  The court held that the executive order was in violation of 
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At the same time, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) began working on regulatory 
efforts to amend the AKS rebate safe harbor protections.200  The final rule first excluded PBMs 
from the safe harbor provisions regarding reductions in price to Medicare Part D plan sponsors.201  
Notably, however, the final rule did not include the same action for Medicaid plan sponsors.202  
Next, the rule created new safe harbors that exempted point-of-sale reductions in price.  The rule 
states that reductions in price from manufacturers to plan sponsors under Medicare Part D or 
Medicaid do not violate the AKS if (1) the reduction in price was set in advance; (2) the “full value 
of the . . . price is provided to the dispensing pharmacy by the manufacturer . . . through point-of-
sale chargeback[s]”; and (3) “the reduction in price [is] completely reflected in the price of the . . 
. product at the time the pharmacy dispenses it to the beneficiary.”203  
Ideally, this rule should protect pharmacies from receiving low reimbursement rates from 
either the plan sponsor or patient copayments.  The rule recognizes, however, that this is unlikely 
to happen.204  Thus, HHS promulgates that the pharmacies will need to be “‘made whole’ through 
the chargeback process,” but offers no formal process for ensuring pharmacies receive the 
chargebacks from the wholesalers, manufacturers, or PBMs.205 
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Lastly, the rule created a fixed fee safe harbor that allows PBMs to set a flat, fixed fee for 
claims adjudication and service fees.206  The final rule was to take effect on January 29, 2021, 
which would have required PBMs to negotiate these prices for contracts to take effect in 2022.207  
The fate of Trump’s executive orders and regulatory action became unknown, however, 
when newly-elected President Joe Biden took office on January 20, 2021.  Within hours of 
ascending the Presidency, President Biden executed a flurry of executive orders and 
memorandums—many aimed specifically at reversing Trump-era actions.208  Among these orders, 
President Biden required a regulatory freeze pending review on all agency actions that were (1) 
issued after noon on January 20, 2021; (2) not yet published in the Federal Register; and (3) had 
been published in the Federal Register, but had not yet taken effect.209  President Biden effectively 
halted all regulatory action, including the final OIG rules, from taking effect until properly 
reviewed and approved by the new administration. 
Although we will have to wait to see what President Biden ultimately will choose to do 
with Trump’s executive orders, his campaign website offers some insights concerning actions he 
may take to address high drug prices.  According to the website, Biden intends to propose that 
Congress repeal the law that bars CMS from directly negotiating drug prices with the 
manufacturers for Medicare patients.  This would effectively allow the federal government to 
bypass PBMs for rebate negotiations and formulary management.210  Biden also suggests limiting 
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aggressive pricing for newly launched products.  He proposes that the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) establish an independent review board to assess the value of the drug and 
recommend a reasonable price. 211   Lastly, Biden intends to allow Americans to purchase 
prescription drugs from other countries.   
While these efforts will be a good first step to lowering drug prices, they will not control 
PBMs’ aggressive pricing schemes or lack of reimbursement to pharmacies.  Thus, while many 
Americans on Medicare may benefit from lower copays and drug prices, Americans utilizing 
private insurers and Medicaid will likely be left to pick up the tab in cost-shifting measures from 
PBMs and manufacturers. Moreover, pharmacies will continue to face large DIR fees and low 
reimbursement rates through PBM claim adjudication. 
A. Future Regulatory and Legislative Efforts 
While enhanced price regulation of the pharmaceutical industry is a good start, the federal 
government needs to regulate the PBMs as well to create a system that will permanently shrink 
drug costs.  The failure to regulate the PBMs permits them to lie, cheat, and steal from the 
manufacturers, pharmacies, insurance companies, and, ultimately, patients.  The incoming 
administration has an opportunity to mold a new regulatory and legislative scheme to effectively 
control drug pricing.   
The quickest way to remedy PBMs’ predatory price gouging is for the executive branch to 
regulate rebate practices with rule-making.  First, President Biden should absolutely approve the 
final OIG rule regarding AKS safe harbors.  While the rule may not be the perfect solution, it’s a 
step in the right direction.  By carving out PBMs from the discount safe harbors, the existing AKS 




management would, instead, be based on therapeutic considerations, such as safety, efficacy, and 
cost-benefit analyses.  The OIG rules also allow for PBMs to negotiate rebates so long as there is 
adequate transparency.  This would ensure that cost savings through rebate negotiations are 
actually passed on to patients and health plans.  A huge pitfall of the OIG rules, however, is that 
pharmacy reimbursement is still not guaranteed.   
Next, CMS must remove the provisions that allow PBMs to implement DIR Fees.  As 
mentioned in Part III, CMS adopted DIR Fees to obtain a better understanding of the actual costs 
of prescription drugs post-sale.212  DIR Fees have been utilized, however, to claw back additional 
money from pharmacies on filled prescriptions.  Thus, in conjunction with Congressional action 
against PBM formulary management as discussed below, DIR Fees will no longer be necessary 
for obtaining the actual costs of prescription drugs.  Eliminating DIR Fees is essential to stopping 
PBMs from clawing back additional money from the pharmacy after the point of sale.  
While executive branch regulatory reform is needed to control PBM practices, 
Congressional action is also required.  First, President Biden has proposed that Congress repeal 
the law that bars the federal government from negotiating rebates with the manufacturers directly.  
This is an absolutely necessary step to decrease PBM power.  Not only would such reform leave 
formulary management to the federal government, it would provide greater prescription drug cost 
transparency.  Allowing the federal government to negotiate drug prices will increase top-down 
transparency and create a predictable financial landscape for pharmacies.  
Congress also should expand upon the executive branch’s regulatory efforts to eliminate 
DIR Fees.  While DIR Fees were initially created by CMS to obtain accurate pricing information, 
PBMs have since utilized DIR Fees to apply hidden fees to pharmacies and engage in predatory 
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audits.213  While some audits are necessary to ensure accurate claims adjudication and dispensing, 
most PBM auditing practices are schemes to realize larger PBM profits.  Congress, therefore, 
should enact legislation concerning current auditing practices that carefully balances the PBM 
interest in ensuring correct claims adjudication with the pharmacy interest in retaining profits from 
selling prescriptions.  For example, providing pharmacies a way to appeal DIR Fees or limiting 
the types of audits PBMs can perform may yield the best results for both parties.  
Next, Congress should require that PBMs pass 90–100% of any rebate through to insurance 
companies and ensure the enforcement of that law by enaction legislation that demands strict 
transparency rules between PBMs and their clients.  Such laws would allow insurance companies 
to realize the full benefits of the rebates provided by manufacturers.  Thus, patient cost-sharing 
measures, such as premiums, copayments, and high deductible plans, would be reduced or obsolete 
in some cases.  Deemphasizing rebates and negotiation as a means for competition between 
manufacturers will drive competition through scientific innovation and, therefore, yielding optimal 
clinical results for patients.  
Fourth, Congress needs to attack PBMs predatory reimbursement rates to keep pharmacies 
afloat.  As a first step in that endeavor, Congress should eliminate preferred pharmacy network 
negotiations.  Preferred pharmacy networks leave pharmacies at a disadvantage by requiring a 
discount on acquisition costs at about 12–15%.214  Thus, elimination of these take-or-leave-it deals 
would allow pharmacies to sell their products at a traditional mark-up.  Some may argue that this 
will result in increased premium payments to patients.  This is exactly why the 90% rebate pass 
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through requirement is absolutely necessary to create a workable system.  So long as payers fail to 
receive adequate rebates from PBMs, they will short pharmacies on their reimbursement rates. 
To ensure that pharmacies are guaranteed their mark-up price, Congress also needs to 
implement a system in which PBMs are required to update their MAC lists for generic medications 
in real time.  Recall from Part III that PBMs are slow to correct MAC pricing when manufacturers 
raise the prices on generics. 215   This causes the pharmacy’s acquisition costs to become 
substantially higher than MAC and, therefore, the pharmacy loses money on each generic 
prescription filled.  Requiring that PBMs provide transparent, updated MAC lists will allow 
pharmacies to fill generic medications from manufacturers that yield the highest profits.   
Lastly, Congress should grant pharmacists federal provider status under Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Provider status will ensure that pharmacists are able to provide more immunizations, 
POC testing (COVID-19, rapid flu test, rapid strep test), disease management services, streamlined 
refills, contraceptives, and additional primary health care services.  Pharmacists ought to be 
properly reimbursed from Medicare for the clinical services they provide.  This change would also 
allow PBMs and insurance companies to shift cost-burdens associated with physician office visits 
to the pharmacies.  Most importantly, this will provide patients with increased access to health 
care providers.  
VI. Conclusion 
As drug costs continue to rise and people continue to get sicker, America can no longer 
stand idly by and watch the system crash.  As for Jeff Olson, he hopes to get off the “Low Pay-
Slow Pay-No Pay” ride as soon as possible.  His biggest worry if the Ferris Wheel keeps spinning?  
The patients and pharmacists.  When asked about the future of community pharmacy, Jeff replied:  
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The PBMs are not here for patient care—they’re here for profit.  This model 
only benefits one group—the PBM.  If this system doesn’t end . . . we’re going to 
see [an increase] of another 2,000–4,000 rural [community] pharmacies closing.  
Patients will be forced to either use mail order or travel up to 40 miles to an urban 
area to find a pharmacy. . . . The only pharmacies that will survive this are those 
that use enhanced [clinical] services.   
 
Jeff realizes that if things do not change with the current PBM structure, health care access 
for many patients will be extremely limited.  In the meantime, Jeff plans to continue to offer high 
level and innovative clinical services to bring in additional revenue to keep his doors open for as 
long as possible.  He hopes that these clinical services will provide meaningful and exciting work 
to pharmacists. 
In thinking about the effect PBMs have on the pharmacy profession landscape, Jeff 
questions where all the new pharmacy graduates will go: “[Pharmacy] students are graduating with 
huge amounts of debt and no way to pay for it—it’s an incredible disservice to new pharmacists.”  
Even in his own pharmacy he has seen these limitations play out.  For example, Jeff explains his 
lack of ability to keep up with providing enhanced services due to low pharmacist staff  numbers.  
Jeff recognizes, however, that he also cannot afford to pay additional pharmacists due to the money 
he loses from PBMs.   
Even though the system seems to be working against him, Jeff says he will continue to 
keep fighting for patients, pharmacists, and pharmacy owners.  While Jeff’s story is the reality for 
many other pharmacy owners, it does not have to continue to be.  Implementing regulatory and 
legislative reform against PBMs in three key areas—rebates, reimbursement rates, and DIR Fees—
will create meaningful change in the life of pharmacies, pharmacists, and patients. 
